C/86419/2014 — HI-TECH ENGINEERS vs MUMBAI EXPORT I
HI-TECH ENGINEERS vs MUMBAI EXPORT I
CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI
WEST ZONAL BENCH
CUSTOMS APPEAL NO: 86419 OF 2014
[Arising out of Order-in-Original CAO No: 136/2013/CAC/CC€/YG/GR.VII dated 29th November 2013 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai.]
Hi-Tech Engineers
Gurudware, South Balanda, Angul, Odissa - 759116
… Appellant versus
Commissioner of Customs (Export Promotion)
New Custom House, Ballard Estate, Mumbai - 400001
…Respondent
WITH
CUSTOMS APPEAL NO: 86470 OF 2014
WITH
CROSS-OBJECTION NO. 91028 OF 2015
[Arising out of Order-in-Original CAO No: 136/2013/CAC/CC€/YG/GR.VII dated 29th November 2013 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai.]
Commissioner of Customs (Export Promotion)
New Custom House, Ballard Estate, Mumbai - 400001
… Appellant versus
Hi-Tech Engineers
Gurudware, South Balanda, Angul, Odissa - 759116
…Respondent APPEARANCE: Shri AK Prabhakar, Advocate for the assesse-appellant Shri Deepak Sharma, Deputy Commissioner (AR) for Revenue
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR C J MATHEW, MEMBER (TECHNICAL) HON’BLE MR AJAY SHARMA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
2 C/86419 & 86470/2014
FINAL ORDER NO: 85796-85797/2025
DATE OF HEARING:
07/11/2024
DATE OF DECISION:
06/05/2025
PER: C J MATHEW
M/s Hi-Tech Engineers has challenged imposition of penalty
under section 114A of Customs Act, 1962 in order1 of Commissioner
of Customs (Export), Mumbai, that confirmed liability to duties of
customs foregone at the time of import along with interest thereon
besides fastening other detriments, on the limited ground that by
acknowledging discharge of liability of ₹ 22,33,965 as duties of
customs, along with ₹ 4,04,000 as interest thereon, jurisdictional
competence precluded invoking of penal provisions for so doing. The
jurisdictional Commissioner of Customs was directed by the competent
committee of Chief Commissioners to appeal against the same order for
not having determined fine goods that, admittedly, were not
confiscated solely for want of availability and for not having enforced
the bond executed by the importer at the time of import obligating itself
to comply with conditions.
2.
Briefly, M/s Hi-Tech Engineers had imported ‘new extec screen
S-5’ with vibrating grid’, valued at ₹ 86,38,227, against bill of entry no.
1 [order-in-original CAO no. 136/2013/CAC/CC€/YG/GR.VII dated 29th November 2013]
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767929/21.05.2007 claiming exemption, vide notification2 intended for
operationalizing the privileges on offer under the ‘export promotion
capital goods (EPCG)’ scheme in the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP), that,
subject to several conditions, inter alia, including fulfilment of
obligation to export goods of proportionate value, was allowed to be
cleared. One of the conditions, viz., that of installation of imported
goods at the stipulated location was, admittedly, breached following
which proceedings were initiated for recovery of duty foregone, along
with interest, and for imposition of penalties contingent upon
confiscation of the goods. The adjudicating authority confirmed the
differential duty as proposed, along with applicable interest, but, while
holding the goods as liable to confiscation under section 111 of
Customs Act, 1962, refrained from fastening fine for redemption owing
to non-availability thereof though penalty of ₹ 2,00,000 was imposed
under section 112 of Customs Act, 1962 besides resorting to section
114A of Customs Act, 1962 for further detriment.
3.
On submission of Learned Counsel that the dispute was
restricted to the penalties alone, the disposal of the appeals had been
transferred to a Single Member Bench; however, that bench, after
having heard both sides at length and reserving orders for final decision,
directed Registry to relist the matter before a Division Bench ostensibly
for lack of jurisdiction.
2 [no. 97/2004 dated 17th September 2004]
4
4.
In the circumstances as set out above, with action having been
initiated as consequence of non-fulfilment of conditions of exemption
notification and, consequently, concerned only with erasure of privilege
of foregoing of duty already assessed at the time of import subject to
fulfilment of export obligation, with no dispute over either rate of duty
or value which vests jurisdiction exclusively with a division bench of
the Tribunal, we are unable to fathom cause for the restoration. Be that
as it may, we do not shirk from exercise of jurisdiction that, doubtlessly,
is parallely not excluded and, though amounting to disregard of plea of
the Learned Counsel, we proceed to dispose off this appeal.
5.
We have heard Learned Counsel and Learned Authorized
Representative at length on the facts and their rival submissions.
Learned Counsel pointed out that there is no finding on the existence of
ingredients warranting the invoking of extended period. It was
contended that the importer had made good the duty along with interest
thereon. According to Learned Authorized Representative, the goods,
even if not available, should have been confiscated and fine charged as
condition of redemption.
6.
It is seen from the impugned order that the recovery of
differential duty has been effected not under section 28 of Customs Act,
1962 but as obligation in bond executed at the time of import. In such
circumstances, we are unable to fathom the expectation in the appeal of
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Revenue on plea for enforcement of bond inasmuch as adjudication is
restricted to ordering of recovery, confiscation – either absolute or on
offer of redemption – and imposition of penalty with actual
enforcement to be effected either through self-compliance by person
liable to pay duty or, in the event of non-compliance, by recourse to
section 142 of Customs Act, 1962. With conclusion of adjudication, the
authority becomes functus officio and ‘certificate action’ is an act of the
executive. For enforcement to be pressed, resort to jurisdiction of
Tribunal is inappropriate. To such extent, review by the competent
committee has failed to exercise application of mind and, hence, not
tenable for relief in appeal. As far as the impugned order is concerned,
it is evident from
‘114A. Penalty for short-levy or non-levy of duty in certain
cases.
- Where the duty has not been levied or has been short-levied or the interest has not been charged or paid or has been part paid or the duty or interest has been erroneously refunded by reason of collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, the person who is liable to pay the duty or interest, as the case may be, as determined under sub-section (2) of section 28 shall also be liable to pay a penalty equal to the duty or interest so determined: xxxx’ of Customs Act, 1962 that penalty, amounting to no less than sum of duty and interest, is erected on two pillars, viz., non-levy or short-levy
6
of duty liability - by reason of collusion, willful misstatement or
suppression of facts - and that the ‘person liable to duty and interest’
stands determined under section 28 of Customs Act, 1962. In the
instant case, the liability has not been determined with reference to
empowerment under section 28 of Customs Act, 1962. There is also no
evidence in the notice that any of the ingredients permitting resort to
section 28(4) of Customs Act, 1962, and thereby to section 114A of
Customs Act, 1962, was manifest at the time of assessment to duties,
even if foregone then. And it does not appear to have impressed itself
on the reviewing authority that the impugned order may have opted for
that very lack to bypass resort to section 28 of Customs Act, 1962. The
adjudication order has not drawn upon any evidence to suggest
otherwise and appears merely to have relied upon the diversion of
impugned goods had been diverted to suggest that this amounted to
misrepresentation; misrepresentation is not a state of mind to be
inferred but patent distortion of facts that must be established. The
factual matrix, incorrectly appreciated by the adjudicating authority
insofar as penalty was concerned and inappropriately overlooked in
submission of Learned Authorized Representative, offers no scope for
imposition of penalty under section 114A of Customs Act, 1962 on M/s
Hi-Tech Engineers. Indeed, the plea in appeal of Commissioner of
Customs for enforcement of the bond does not sit well with the
contention of Learned Authorized Representative that equal penalty
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was in order.
7.
Further, it is seen that the finding of
‘11.5.7 As regards liability of the importer company M/s. Hi-
Tech Engineers to be penalized under the provisions of Section
114A of the Act, I find that as discussed above,; the importer
knowing fully well that they do not have any export orders or
plans for export of iron ore, applied and obtained an EPCG
Licence and imported the impugned goods saving customs duty
amounting to Rs.22.33,965/-(Twenty Two Lac Thirty Three
Thousand Nine hundred and Sixty Five only) based on such
mis-declaration of their status as Manufacturer-Exporter, I
find that penalty under Section 114A is imposable on the
importer , I find that Section 114A prescribes that "Where the
duty has not been levied or has been short-levied or the interest
has not been charged or paid or has been part paid or the duty
or interest has been erroneously refunded by reason of
collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts,
the person who is liable to pay the duty or interest, as the case
may be, as determined under sub-section (8) of section 28 shall
also be liable to pay a penalty equal to the duty or interest so
determined," However, I find that vide circular no. 61/2002-
Cus. dated 20.09.2002 CBEC has clarified that "penalty under
section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 should be equivalent to
duty and interest. The above-said clarification may kindly be
kept in mind while imposing the penalty under section 114A of
the Customs Act, 1962." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of
Union of India Vs Arviva Industries reported in 2007(209) ELT
5(S.C.) has held that the CBEC Circulars are binding on the
Department and thus I hold that penalty equal to duty and
interest is leviable in this case under Section 114A of the Act.’
8 merely narrates statutory empowerment and intra-mural instruction without establishing that the ingredients for invoking section 114A did exist. It is also not as if the notice did, in some way, provide the armament for persuading the adjudicating authority that this was so. Consequently, it may safely be said that the imposition of penalty under section 114A of Customs Act, 1962 is improper. 8. It only remains for us to examine the alleged impropriety in not quantifying fine under section 125 of Customs Act, 1962 as condition for redemption of goods. Goods are, admittedly, not available and not retainable, thereby, for transfer back to the title holder upon complying with payment of fine. Such is merely an option which does not present itself for exercise by importer in the absence of need for the goods. Non-exercise of option crystalizes the ownership in the hands of the Central Government and determination of fine for redemption of goods, that do not vest by confiscation and which cannot be made available by Central Government on compliance with fine, is nothing but a futile exercise bordering on farce. The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Finesse Creation Inc [2009 (248) ELT 122 (Bom)] that was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that goods already cleared and not available physically for confiscation cannot be burdened with fine under section 125 of Customs Act, 1962. 9. In view of our finding supra, there is no merit in recourse to
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section 114A of Customs Act, 1962 owing to which the appeal of
importer is allowed to set aside the penalty therein. For the reasons
cited supra, we hold the appeal of Commissioner of Customs
(Preventive), Mumbai to be without merit and liable to be dismissed.
(Order pronounced in the open court on 06/05/2025)
(AJAY SHARMA)
Member (Judicial)
(C J MATHEW)
Member (Technical)
*/as
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